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Introduction
Copyright law affords protection for the "expression" of a graphic
character.' This expression may refer to its appearance 2 or the "pattern"
that identifies it.3 Copyright law offers one method of protecting valua-
ble rights in graphic characters. Several other options exist under the
rubric of "unfair competition," one of which is trademark law. Trade-
mark infringement has been called a "species" of the "genus" known as
unfair competition.'
The purpose of trademark law is" 'not to "protect" trademarks, but
... to protect the consuming public from confusion, concomitantly pro-
tecting the trademark owner's right to a non-confused public.' "I As a
result, unfair competition and trademark law attempt to prevent "pass-
ing off." Passing off may occur by presenting someone else's work as
your own or by offering your own work as someone else's product, lead-
ing to a deception of the public.
Trademark law can be used to protect graphic characters if an in-
fringing character or product confuses the public as to its source. This
Essay explores the use of trademark infringement theories to protect
rights in graphic characters. First, it considers federal trademark law.
The Essay discusses how courts determine if a secondary meaning exists
in a character. Without a secondary meaning, no passing off can occur.
Next, certain aspects of graphic characters, such as costumes and nick-
names, are considered candidates for protection. Finally, state antidilu-
tion statutes are considered as an alternative basis for infringement
claims. This Essay concludes with a discussion of the implications of
certain trends in unfair competition law in an "information age."
1. "It is an axiom of copyright law that the protection granted to a copyrighted work
extends only to the particular expression of the idea and never to the idea itself." Sid & Marty
Krofft TV Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
2. 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 17.45, at 17-90 (1989).
3. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
4. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY § 17.03, at 17-7 n.2 (quoting S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1274, 1275).
5. Superior Models, Inc. v. Tolkien Enters., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 587, 591 (D. Del.
1981) (citation omitted) (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225,
1228 (3d Cir. 1978), which was quoting James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc.,
540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976)).
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I
The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act6 is the federal trademark statute that protects
characters in interstate commerce. From its inception, the Lanham Act
was seen as a potential expansion of the traditional reach of trademark
law. In 1944, a commentator wrote that "'the provisions of the bill
broaden the nature of trademarks; ... they increase the scope of existent
substantive trademark rights.' "" The pertinent section of the Lanham
Act is section 43(a):
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with an-
other person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the na-
ture, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or
another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be lia-
ble in a civil action to any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.8
Section 43(a) protects unregistered trademarks from "false designa-
tions of origin" and prevents "any false or misleading description or rep-
resentation of fact."9  This protection is broader than that given
registered trademarks; not only is the trade or service mark protected,
but "the total physical image created by the products or services and
their names together" is also protected.' 0
A. Likelihood of Confusion
The crux of a section 43(a) suit is the "likelihood of confusion" that
an infringing mark may cause the public. The Second Circuit offers six
factors to consider in determining the likelihood of confusion:
(1) The strength of the plaintiff's marks and name;
(2) The similarity of plaintiff's and defendant's marks;
(3) The proximity of plaintiff's and defendant's products;
6. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)).
7. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought,
69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 333 (1979) (quoting Hall, Possible Monopoly Implications in the
Trademark Bill, 32 GEO. L.J. 171, 172 (1944)).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
9. Id.
10. 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 2, § 17.37, at 17-73.
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(4) Evidence of actual confusion as to source or sponsorship;
(5) Sophistication of the defendant's audience; and
(6) Defendant's good or bad faith."1
The above factors are self-explanatory, except that the fourth factor only
calls for evidence of actual confusion and not actual harm. Even then,
evidence of actual confusion is not required, although it is "highly proba-
tive of [the] likelihood of confusion." 2 Generally, in the realm of
graphic characters, a likelihood of confusion is established by showing
that the character has acquired a "secondary meaning. '13 Some of the
other factors listed above may then be used as additional evidence of
potential confusion.
B. Establishing Secondary Meaning
"'."Secondary meaning" means an association in the minds of the
buying public between the name of the product and the product itself or
its source.' ",a "Source" can mean the character's "origin, sponsorship,
authorization, or other affiliation." 5 Practically, if secondary meaning
has attached to a product, then another producer's misappropriation of
the trademark may lead the public to mistakenly believe that the mark's
true owner endorsed or licensed the second producer's product. The sec-
ond producer's misappropriation of the trademark may also prevent the
true owner from giving a license to others.I6 Considering the prevalence
of the licensing of movie and television characters today, it seems likely
that if a secondary meaning is established, a court will find that an unli-
censed user had confused the public.
1. Culliford v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
One can see how secondary meaning is established or denied in the
cases of Culliford v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. ' and Superior
Models, Inc. v. Tolkien Enterprises. Is Culliford pitted the creator of the
"Smurfs" against CBS Records. An artist on the CBS label, Tyrone
"Tystick" Brunson, had composed an instrumental recording called The
11. Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1982).
12. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
13. 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 2, § 17.45, at 17-89.
14. Culliford v. Columbia Brdcst. Sys., Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1984)
(quoting American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science v. Hearst Corp., 498 F. Supp. 244,
256 (D.D.C. 1980)).
15. 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 2, § 17.45, at 17-89.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 72-73.
17. 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497 (D.D.C. 1984).
18. 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 587 (D. Del. 1981), modified on other grounds, 211 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 587 (D. Del. 1984).
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Smurf In determining if the name "Smurf" had a secondary meaning,
the District Court for the District of Columbia considered four factors.9
First, the court examined the duration and continuity of the use of
the name "Smurf." The court noted that since Pierre Culliford's creation
of the Smurfs in 1958, he had used and licensed them continuously for
the production of books, toys, television cartoons, and five record al-
bums. Second, the court considered the extent and the amount of money
spent on advertising the Smurfs. Huge sums of money had been spent
promoting the Smurfs world-wide.20 Third, the court viewed the sales of
Smurf products. In the area of sound recordings alone, the Smurf al-
bums had sold over one million copies in the United States.2 1 Finally,
the court compared the two parties' respective markets, finding that the
same young adults might buy Smurf albums for their children and The
Smurf instrumental for themselves.22
Culliford was also able to show actual confusion. A Billboard mag-
azine review of the instrumental clearly demonstrated that the reviewer
believed there was some sort of authorization and relationship to the
other five children's Smurf albums.23 CBS further implicated itself by
using Smurf language in publicity releases. 24 The court found that the
Smurfs had acquired a secondary meaning and that there was a likeli-
hood of confusion. It therefore granted a preliminary injunction.
2 Superior Models v. Tolkien Enterprises
In contrast, a secondary meaning was not found in Superior Models,
Inc. v. Tolkien Enterprises.25 Superior Models was the maker of small
fantasy figures such as Gandalf, Orc, and Strider, based on characters
contained in J.R.R. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings trilogy. Interest in the
characters had, in large part, been generated by the release of a Lord of
the Rings film in 1978. Tolkien Enterprises licensed the use of Tolkien
characters but had not authorized the Superior Model figures. Under
trademark law, if no secondary meaning existed in the characters, their
use by Superior Models could not cause the public confusion and, thus,
there would be no infringement. To prove secondary meaning, Tolkien
Enterprises conducted a survey of college students. 51.3 percent recog-
19. Culliford, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 499 (citing American Ass'n for the Advancement of
Science v. Hearst Corp., 498 F. Supp. 244, 257 (D.D.C. 1980)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 500.
23. Id.
24. The release read "the future looks bright for Tyrone Brunson.... In any event he's off
to a 'smurfin' good start." Id. at 501.
25. 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 587 (D. Del. 1981).
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nized the Lord of the Rings as a series of books written by Tolkien, while
52.8 percent identified "Hobbits" with Tolkien 6 Other identifications
to Middle Earth or particular character names like Bilbo Baggins showed
lower results.
Even aside from these unimpressive results, the survey was fatally
flawed in another way: it had shown no confusion by the public in rela-
tion to the figures. The court would have been more impressed by a
survey in which each student was presented with several of the figures
and asked with whom they associated the characters. Even then, the
percentages probably needed to be higher. A further problem was that
Tolkien Enterprises had not advertised or promoted the characters exten-
sively prior to the release of the movie, while Superior Models' produc-
tion of the figures had predated the film. Without a secondary meaning,
confusion could not be shown; therefore, a section 43(a) Lanham Act
violation could not be established.
C. Determining the Secondary Meaning of Graphic Characters
1. Popularity
Graphic characters often are found to have secondary meaning, but
the factors a court will consider in making the determination vary. The
popularity of the character is perhaps the major consideration. Smurfs
so inundated the mass media that one might have described them as a
"blue plague," but the Tolkien characters came from books published
long ago and were popularized on a truly wide scale only recently
through a marginally popular animated film. If only one in two college
students recognized the main characters, other demographic groups less
likely to have read the trilogy would have made even less of a connection.
Additionally, the more arbitrary or fanciful a popular character is,
the more likely a court will find a secondary meaning. Many of Tolkien's
characters had direct antecedents in Norse mythology; Smurfs, both in
name and appearance, were purely creations of Culliford's mind. Wide-
spread, continuous, and profitable licensing, in conjunction with aggres-
sive protection of the characters, is also helpful in establishing a
secondary meaning. Evidence of actual confusion, whether in survey or
anecdotal form, may be the decisive force.
2. Protectable Elements
In the field of graphic characters, certain aspects of a character may
be given protection, while other aspects may not. An example of this can
26. Id. at 591.
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be found in DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Associates,2 7 which involved
DC's comic book characters "Aquaman" and "Plastic Man." Filmation
Associates produced animated shows for themselves and for others under
contract2" and had produced an Aquaman television cartoon for DC in
1967. DC, separately from Filmation, produced Superfriends in 1973,
which contained Aquaman cartoons, and a Plastic Man series in 1979.29
Aquaman, with his sidekicks, Mera, a female amphibian, and Tusky, the
humanoid walrus, engaged in underwater adventures and battles against
their arch nemesis, the evil Black Manta. Plastic Man was an adventurer
with the ability to stretch his body into various shapes.
In 1978, Filmation produced the television cartoon Tarzan and the
Super Seven. Two of the cartoon characters making up the Super Seven
were "Superstretch," a hero with the ability to stretch his body, and
"Manta and Moray," underwater adventurers who had a humanoid wal-
rus companion named "Whiskers." Although Filmation Associates had
acquired an option on Plastic Man, they had not exercised it. In re-
sponse to Filmation's cartoon, DC sued to protect its characters. Two of
DC's claims were premised on the Lanham Act. DC's position was that
all of their characters, and the characters' traits and powers, were pro-
tected. Defendants asserted that the Lanham Act protected only against
"palming off" and that no palming off could be shown because they had
not represented DC as the source of their cartoons.
Although the court believed the action should have been brought
under the Copyright Act, 30 it nevertheless found liability under the Lan-
ham Act.31 Where the product is "entertainment," certain aspects may
amount to a trademark if there is a likelihood of confusion as to the
sponsor or source. Specifically, the court continued, "Protectable 'ingre-
dients' recognized in this circuit include the names and nicknames of
entertainment characters, as well as their physical appearances and cos-
tumes, but not their physical abilities or personality traits. ' 32 As to
physical abilities, the court further stated,
27. 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
28. Id. at 1276.
29. Id. at 1275.
30. The court also stated that the Lanham Act was not preempted by the Copyright Act.
See id. at 1277.
31. Id. at 1279. However, the court greatly reduced DC's damages, finding no damages as
to Aquaman, who only appeared in syndicated reruns by 1978. See id. at 1281. Damages as to
Plastic Man were reduced from a jury award of $817,765.50 to a ceiling of $221,339. Some
damages were sustained in the Plastic Man action because DC had attempted to recently sell a
Plastic Man series. The Superstretch series reduced the market demand for such a show. See
id. at 1281-83.
32. Id. at 1277.
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The failure of any court so far to grant Lanham Act protection for
character traits or abilities makes sense since it is difficult to see how
such intangible qualities, having an infinite number of possible visible
and audible manifestations, can achieve that fixture or consistency of
representation that would seem necessary to constitute a symbol in the
public mind.33
As to comic book characters, this seems a sensible line to draw.
Identical physical abilities or "superpowers" have always been exhibited
in more than one character owned by different companies. Taking, for
example, the characters in Filmation Associates, DC has a character
known as "Elongated Man," with the identical abilities of "Plastic
Man." In fact, Elongated Man was himself a pirated version of Plastic
Man from an earlier time when Charlton Comics still owned the Plastic
Man character. DC's main comics competitor, Marvel Comics, also has
a stretching character named "Mister Fantastic." Over the years and on
a regular basis, all three stretching characters have shaped themselves
into parachutes to save themselves or comrades, slid under doors or
through keyholes, and formed hammers with their hands to bash evil-
doers. Marvel Comics also has its equivalent to Aquaman in the charac-
ter of "Namor, the Submariner," an amphibious man who also engages
in underwater derring-do, and who is also the monarch of an undersea
kingdom.
3. Protection of Physical Elements
Outside the comics field, the Filmation Associates court cited Booth
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 34 for the proposition that physical abilities alone
are not protected by the Lanham Act. The plaintiff was actress Shirley
Booth, who had portrayed "Hazel" on a television series based on a car-
toon by the same name. Colgate-Palmolive, with the permission of the
copyright holder, used an animated Hazel in a television advertisement.
For the cartoon, Colgate-Palmolive hired an actress who imitated Shirley
Booth's voice- from the television series. In finding against Booth, the
court stated, "There is no indication that [Booth] used her voice in con-
nection with any 'goods or services,' nor that her voice alone can serve as
a trademark[,] . . .nor even that the defendants used any description or
made any representation to identify her. ... " Although this case seems
more in line with cases involving the rights of entertainers to protect
their distinctive styles,36 it does in one sense suggest that a "physical
ability" alone will not support a Lanham Act suit.
33. Id.
34. 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
35. Id. at 349.
36. See Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
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D. Protecting Costumes and the "Cowboy" Cases
Costume is another aspect of a graphic character that is protected,
according to the Filmation Associates court. Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders v. Pussycat Cinema " was a suit brought by the famous football
cheerleading squad against the makers of the XXX-rated film Debbie
Does Dallas. At the end of the movie, Debbie wears a costume very simi-
lar to that of the Cowboys' cheerleaders. Advertisements had stated,
"Starring Ex-Dallas Cowgirl Cheerleader Bambi Woods." 38 Not surpris-
ingly, "Bambi" had never been a member of the squad.
In finding for the cheerleaders, the court stated that confusion over
the sponsor's approval of the movie was all that was necessary to satisfy
the Lanham Act. As the court stated, "In the instant case, the uniform
depicted in Debbie Does Dallas unquestionably brings to mind the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders. Indeed, it is hard to believe that anyone who had
seen defendants' sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate
it from plaintiff's cheerleaders." 39 The statement seems to imply that the
judge himself could have trouble disassociating the two. Here, as in the
infamous Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates'° case, it seems as if a
sense of moral outrage combined with trademark law will ensure protec-
tion for the plaintiff.
Other cases have also protected costumes. In Lone Ranger, Inc. v.
Currey," the defendant was permanently enjoined from wearing "the
cowboy garb and mask[,] ... the silver studded trappings[,] and the two
guns worn by 'The Lone Ranger.' ,42 The defendant had been decep-
tively appearing as the Lone * Ranger (Lone Star Ranger) at rodeos
around the country. After multiple warnings, suit was finally brought
because of an incident in Charlotte, North Carolina, in which Currey
had beaten his horse to the point that animal cruelty protests were raised
by people in the community. The proprietors of the Lone Ranger had to
take out advertisements disassociating the Lone Ranger from Currey.
37. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
38. Id. at 203.
39. Id. at 205.
40. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). In Walt Disney, the
defendant parodists used Disney cartoon characters in adult underground comic books.
Notwithstanding the fact that the comics were a parody, the court found copyright infringe-
ment. Id. at 758. The book portrayed the Disney cartoon characters as free thinking, promis-
cuous, drug ingesting counterculturists. Another example is the court's observation in
Culliford that the performer of "The Smurf" is nicknamed "Tystick," which is the street name
of an illegal drug. See Culliford v. Columbia Brdcst. Sys., Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497, 501
(D.D.C. 1984).
41. 79 F. Supp. 190 (D. Pa. 1948).
42. Id. at 195.
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This was definitely one case in which the defendant's continued bad faith
helped decide the case.
Another cowboy case, Wyatt Earp Enterprises v. Sackman, Inc.,43
found that a historical character had acquired a secondary meaning
through the Wyatt Earp television movies. The costumes produced by
the defendant continued to be closely patterned after Marshall Earp's
television costume, even after a licensing agreement with the show's pro-
ducers expired. The court enjoined the defendant's use of the costume.
Since purely functional items are not protected by trademark law,
one might suspect that costumes would not be protected. However, cos-
tumes on graphic characters are often arbitrary and nonfunctional, as in
the three cases above. The cheerleaders' uniforms, in their arbitrary
combination of color and design, achieved a secondary meaning capable
of protection.' Similarly, the costume of "Spider-Man" is arbitrary and
nonfunctional. One who copies the familiar red and blue suit covered
with an overlay of black webbing will be guilty of a Lanham Act
violation.
Beyond such distinctive and well-known costumes, however, one
must question how far protection reaches for costume alone. In both
Dallas Cowboys and Lone Ranger, the potential damage to the accumu-
lated good will of the marks weighed heavily in favor of extending pro-
tection to the costume alone. In Wyatt Earp, there had been a
preexisting business relationship that had expired, but the costumes had
not changed. Thus, in many cases, it seems likely that additional evi-
dence beyond the mere copying of a costume will be required to establish
infringement.
E. Protecting Nicknames
The same also may be true of names and nicknames of graphic char-
acters. In Wyatt Earp, each costume box had been imprinted with the
phrase "Official Wyatt Earp." The defendant contended, "[T]he name
... belonged to a living person out of the [N]ation's history, and hence
has become a part of the public domain not subject to commercial mo-
nopolization by anyone." '45 The court found that the name was protected
since it had acquired a secondary meaning through the television series.
The court particularly relied on the fact that "Official" was printed on
the boxes, implying authorization by the makers of the television films.
It is unclear how the court would have ruled if the word "Official" had
43. 157 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
44. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc.. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d
Cir. 1974).
45. Wyatt Earp Enters. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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been omitted, as the package contained neither a picture of television's
Wyatt Earp nor any reference to ABC-TV, the producer of the series.
In Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox,46 a man who had played the Lone
Ranger in the movies was enjoined from using the name to advertise his
circus performance. The defendant could no longer promote himself as
the Lone Ranger. He could only use the name with reference to his hav-
ing been the actor in the movie. Again, additional facts strengthened the
plaintiff's case, as the defendant was using the phrase "Hi Yo Silver,
away" in his act. In any event, the name "Lone Ranger" was not put
completely beyond the defendant's reach. He simply could not claim he
was the Lone Ranger.
One "nickname" case, American Footwear v. General Footwear,4 7
failed to find protection for the word "bionic" in reference to shoes. The
defendant, General Footwear, was a licensee of Universal City Studios
and had acquired the right to use "bionic" on its shoes. The term had
been popularized by Universal's television series The Six Million Dollar
Man and The Bionic Woman." Plaintiff had applied for trademark use
of "bionic" after the show became popular and before Universal or Gen-
eral Footwear attempted to trademark the word in relation to shoes. The
court stated that seniority alone did not establish the rights of the first
user. Regardless, the court found that the term "bionic" had been used
descriptively by the television series. The advertisements by American
Footwear emphasized American's name, and there seemed to be little
similarity between the hiking boots of American and the children's
sneakers of General Footwear. The court discounted a survey's results
because it used the wording, "With whom or what do you associate a
product labelled Bionic?" instead of the court's suggested, "With whom
or what do you associate a 'Bionic' boot?"49 In addition, the survey did
not take into account the many references to American Footwear at
trade shows where the advertisements were posted.
The court properly stated that the test under the Lanham Act was
"the likelihood that the consuming public will be confused as to the
source of the allegedly infringing product."5 But there are problems
with the court's application of this test.
First, the court largely ignored strong survey information. In one
survey of 802 people, fifty-five percent associated the word "bionic" with
46. 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942).
47. 609 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980).
48. The Six Million Dollar Man (Universal Studios, ABC television series, Jan. 18, 1974
to Mar. 6, 1978); The Bionic Woman (Universal Studios, ABC and NBC (final season) televi-
sion series, Jan. 14, 1976 to Sept. 2, 1978).
49. 609 F.2d at 661 n.4.
50. Id. at 664.
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the television shows.51 In a second survey of 307 people, 74.3 percent
associated the advertising poster for the boots with the series. 52 It seems
unlikely that the minor change in wording suggested by the court would
have greatly altered these results, if at all. Using an admittedly unscien-
tific method, this author found that when people were asked the court's
suggested question, they tended to focus on the word "bionic," ignored
the word "boot," and made the connection to the television shows that
now only appear in syndication.
Second, although the product was hiking boots, the poster depicted
a woman running, similar to many promotions for The Bionic Woman.
One does not generally associate hiking boots with going for a jog.
Third, the court states that Universal had not yet entered the field of
footwear, so that confusion was unlikely, especially between hiking boots
and children's sneakers. Yet one could analogize to the children's and
adult's records in the Culliford case. In both situations, the same young
adults might have bought one set of items for their children and the other
for themselves. The court's argument also fails to take into account the
inundation of the market with "bionic" merchandising in other areas,
such as clothing and toys. It seems unlikely that many consumers, una-
ware of the term and thereafter being surrounded by it through this type
of merchandising, would think "bionic" was merely descriptive.
Finally, the court stated, "[W]hile American certainly intended to
capitalize on Universal's popularization of the word 'bionic,' we find that
it did not so capitalize by confusing consumers."53 But the fact that
American used its name a great deal in the advertisements would lead to
the conclusion that they were licensees, not that American was indepen-
dently making hiking boots described as "bionic." However, the court
did not see the case in this manner, as the Second Circuit found both
parties could continue to use the word "bionic." The Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari without comment in 1980. This may have been the fairest
result, but it does not seem in line with the trend towards expansion of
the Lanham Act in "source or sponsorship" cases. Certainly, finding the
word "bionic" to be a trademark seems less of a stretch than finding that
actual historical figures plucked from the public domain had acquired
secondary meanings.
51. Id. at 661.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 662.
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II
Antidilution Statutes
Like the Lanham Act, state antidilution statutes may be used to pro-
tect against confusion or damage to a trademark's accumulated good
will. In both cases, the public is protected from passing off. This overlap
in protection explains why many suits assert both Lanham Act and an-
tidilution claims.
The "distinctiveness" of a trademark is protected by antidilution
statutes without requiring a showing of public confusion or competition
between goods.5 4 The distinctiveness aspect was advanced to fill a per-
ceived gap in the Lanham Act. It seemed unfair that after promoting a
mark to make it popular, the mark's very success might ironically lead to
its "death" by dilution. There existed " 'this paradox that the very crea-
tion of any real hold on the public mind through trademark advertising
and merchandising [could] in and through itself, automatically involve
the self-destruction of the mark.' "" It is this concern that led to protec-
tion of "distinctiveness" through antidilution statutes. Whenever an un-
licensed use of a mark may cause a "'diminution in the uniqueness and
individuality'" of the mark,56 the plaintiff may have a remedy under a
state antidilution statute.
A. Restraints in Applying the Antidilution Doctrine
As one might expect, the dilution concept has the potential to be-
come quite amorphous. For this reason, courts often use restraint in ap-
plying the antidilution doctrine. For example, in denying protection for
the King of Monsters, "Godzilla," against the Sears garbage-bag charac-
ter, "Bagzilla," the court stated, "We have regarded the antidilution doc-
trine with some concern 'lest it swallow up all competition in the claim of
protection against trade name infringement.' ,7
Concern for unfair competition aspects of antidilution often
manifests itself as a requirement that the mark be "strong" or very dis-
tinctive. Alternatively, it is possible that a seemingly strong mark may
become so diluted that the statutes no longer offer protection. The crux
54. 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 2, § 17.03 at 17-8.
55. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 439, 466 (1956) (quoting Schechter, Trade Morals & Regulation: The American
Scene, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 190, 202-04 (1937)).
56. 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 2, § 17.03, at 17-8 n.7 (quoting Pignons SA de
Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 494-95 (1st Cir. 1981)).
57. Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Carter-
Wallace, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 803 n.3 (9th Cir. 1970)).
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of the injury from dilution is a "gradual whittling""8 of the character, but
a character already dispersed cannot be gradually whittled. An example
of dilution is Universal City Studios v. Nintendo Co.," which involved "a
dispute over two gorillas."' The gorillas' "representatives" were
Nintendo, the makers of "Donkey Kong," and Universal, who claimed
rights in the character "King Kong." A few years earlier in a different
action against RKO and Dino DeLaurentis regarding remake rights,
Universal had contended that King Kong and his story were in the pub-
lic domain. Now Universal was in the uncomfortable position of arguing
the other side, asserting rights in King Kong, which they had acquired
through a settlement and claiming secondary meaning and distinctive-
ness for the character.
Unfortunately for Universal, multiple parties over the years had
granted licenses in the character for a variety of uses. At times, attorneys
attempting to secure their clients' rights to use the character had been
unable to determine King Kong's rightful owner. The court found that
these "conflicting ownership rights" led to a "fatal vagueness of Univer-
sal's King Kong character."61 In addition, King Kong's name had been
included in dictionaries and even in a thesaurus. The confusion among
licensors made it difficult to argue that any consumer could attribute
King Kong products to a single source. Universal failed to establish a
secondary meaning.
The court relied on this finding to reach a decision on the dilution
issue. According to the court, the state antidilution statute contained
"even stricter requirements of distinctiveness" than a finding of secon-
dary meaning.62 The various owners of the King Kong mark had diluted
the character to the point where the gorilla was too indistinct to be pro-
tected. Ironically, the real victor in the case was not Donkey Kong.
Mario the carpenter, Donkey Kong's nemesis, would become far more
lucrative and popular than Donkey Kong, as one of the "Mario
Brothers."
Even if a character's identity is strong, the new use must still be
found to "blur" its identity or "tarnish" its positive image before a court
will grant relief.6" In Conan Properties v. Mattel, Inc.," "He-Man of
58. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825
(1927).
59. 578 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
60. Id. at 913.
61. Id. at 925.
62. Id. at 930.
63. Note, Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O'-The- Wisp?, 77 HARV. L. REV.
520, 531 (1964).
64. 712 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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Eternia" was found not to dilute "Conan the Barbarian" because no evi-
dence was presented "at all that Mattel's He-Man ha[d] blurred or tar-
nished CPI's Conan trademark."65 Conan may have had a distinctive
identity, particularly after the release of the Conan movies. To constitute
dilution, He-Man still had to be similar enough to have a direct effect on
the Conan property.
B. Broader Application of Antidilution Principles
Because of the antidilution doctrine's amorphous nature, the princi-
ples may be applied too broadly by the court. This is particularly true
where an actual historical figure is involved. In Instrumentalist Co. v.
Marine Corps League,66 a conflict arose when the Marine Corps League
decided to change the name of its "Distinguished Musician Award" to
the "John Philip Sousa Award for Musical Excellence." The plaintiff,
which publishes The Instrumentalist magazine, had been distributing a
"John Philip Sousa Band Award" since 1955, and since 1973 had a
trademark in "John Philip Sousa" for "awards in the nature of
plaques."
67
The Marine Corps League, once it became aware of the problem,
changed the name of its award to "Semper Fidelis" to prevent any confu-
sion with The Instrumentalist award. However, the "Semper Fidelis"
award also contained a likeness of Sousa. The court thought that this
still might lead to dilution of The Instrumentalist award, which con-
tained a depiction of Sousa as well. The result was that The Marine
Corps League, a group with strong links to the United States Marine
Corps, was enjoined from using Sousa's name or likeness in its "Semper
Fidelis" award, despite the fact that Sousa had been director of the
Marine Corps band and had written the famous march "Semper Fidelis"
for the Marine Corps.
As in Wyatt Earp, an actual historical figure was made the subject of
a successful unfair competition claim. If a Marine Corps related group
can be enjoined from using Sousa's likeness, one must question if there
are any limits to the potential reach of antidilution statutes. The Instru-
mentalist case is an example of the kind of result that can stem from too
broad an application of the dilution doctrine.68 Something seems inher-
ently "unfair" in allowing individuals to use unfair competition doctrines
65. Id. at 363.
66. 509 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. 11. 1981).
67. Id. at 326.




to pull historical figures from the public domain and mark them off'for
their own personal use.
III
Protection in the "Information Age"
Frank Schechter once wrote that "judicial expressions of impatience
with the old theories of trademark protection are indicative of a desire to
keep abreast of and to serve the needs of modern'business."69 The law of
unfair competition protects business and society, but this is a symbiotic
relationship. Changes in business and society will shape changes in the
law of unfair competition as well.
For example, the expansion of the reach of federal trademark law is
in large part a reflection of parallel changes in society. In an "informa-
tion age," an increasing number of facts, ideas, and expressions are avail-
able through remote control. The explosion on cable of public access and
information networks, Music Television (MTV), entertainment and chil-
dren's channels, in conjunction with video cassette recorders (VCRs), en-
sures that the number of characters, and the speed with which they
become popular, will continue to increase.
A. Accelerating Secondary Meaning
The speed with which a character can achieve a secondary meaning
has accelerated. For example, Eastman and Laird created the Teenage
Mutant Ninja Turtles as a low budget, black-and-white, independent
comic book aimed at comics fans in their late teens and early twenties.70
The characters were meant to be a satirical spoof of genres popular with
the younger comics crowd. Within a few short years, a mainstream color
comic was released, followed shortly by an animated show, popular toys,
and a breakfast cereal. Finally, a hit movie ensured that anyone near a
television set recognized the Turtles and what they looked like. The Tur-
tles themselves have now spawned "rip-offs" like Eclipse Comics' Adoles-
cent Radioactive Black Belt Hamsters, which is, in effect, a "spoof" of a
",spoof."71
69. Schechter, supra note 58, at 813.
70. The original black-and-white version has been published by Mirage Studios since
1984. These issues are created by Eastman and Laird. The more recent mainstream color
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles Adventures are published by Archie Comics. Eastman and
Laird are not directly involved in the art or stories in these issues. Archie originally published
a three-issue mini-series adapted from the television cartoon and released between August and
December of 1988. An ongoing color series from Archie Comics has been published from
March 1989 to the present.
71. The Adolescent Black Belt Hamsters comic book was published from 1986 to 1988 by
Comic Castle/Eclipse Comics.
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But the number of characters in the public consciousness is also in-
creasing, thereby expanding the reach of trademark and dilution theo-
ries. The prevalence of the mass media in the average person's life
guarantees that any popular character is likely to develop a strong secon-
dary meaning, at least in the licensing/endorsement sense in vogue to-
day. The manner in which popular characters pass through each aspect
of the mass media only increases their impact on American culture. For
example, it would have been almost impossible to escape the media blitz
during the release of Batman in the summer of 1989. The motion picture
was promoted in advertisements, television shows, newspapers, and
magazines; while the popular "Bat Dance" by Prince resulted in both
music video and traditional radio air-play. Even after the hype climaxed,
the film moved to videotape rentals and sales, and cable movie channels.
Eventually, Batman will progress to network television, probably just
before a sequel is released, beginning the process once again.
Thus, a movie need not be seen nor must a song be heard to be
included in the exposure and concomitant creation of a secondary mean-
ing. Those in a music store will see the Prince/Batman display in the
window. At the video store they will see the posters. At the mall, they
will continue to see the merchandise, in which some level of interest will
be maintained as the movie progresses from film to television. After this
level of saturation, how could anyone see an item bearing a "bat" logo
without making the obvious licensing association?
B. Identifying the Source
This type of "likelihood of confusion" is presently a pivotal determi-
nation in the Lanham Act, and secondary meaning associations gauge
the confusion. The assumption is that if the public identifies the
"source," then mistaken conclusions will be drawn by the consumer as to
endorsements or licensing. But is this assumption really valid?
As long ago as 1927, Schechter wrote, "It has been repeatedly
pointed out ... that, owing to the ramifications of modem trade and the
... distribution of goods from the manufacturer through.., the retailer
to the consumer, the source or origin of the goods bearing a well[-]known
trademark is seldom known to the consumer."' 72 As Schechter points
out, at best, consumers know that two products with the same trademark
come from the same anonymous source.73
. But given changes since 1927, at least in the area of character mer-
chandising, even the "same anonymous source" assumption might be
72. Id. at 814.
73. Id. at 816.
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questioned. Does the parent who buys Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles®
breakfast cereal74 think there is a relation to the licensee producing toy
figures? Certainly, most parents do not know the names Eastman and
Laird, but do they even consider some sort of guarantee as to the quality
of the cereal and the toys because they derive from the makers of the
comic books? Franklin Waldheim gives the example of a mother buying
a pail for her child with a picture of Donald Duck on it. Is she really
buying the pail because of the reputation of Disney (or, more accurately,
of Disney's licensee), or is she simply buying it because she likes the pic-
ture?7 If she then buys Mickey Mouse socks, is she thinking about en-
suring that the socks were made by the same merchant, or does she just
think that Mickey Mouse makes her child happy?7 6 "If it means the
former-we have a trademark plus a copyright use. If it means the lat-
ter-we have a copyright use alone."77 The distinction may be great
when one considers that the Lanham Act, unlike the Copyright Act, con-
tains no termination provision.7
It seems likely that the hypothetical parent gives little thought to
manufacturers, licenses, or endorsements. As long as the law makes an
assumption with respect to source identification, surveys of a public fed
by the mass media will continue to find secondary meaning in a widening
array of graphic characters, historical or otherwise. These assumptions,
in conjunction with the mass media, will continue to stretch the Lanham
Act in a way that will increasingly encroach upon the public domain.
C. Effect on Dilution
In the dilution area as well, one might predict that problems will
develop, caused by shifts in business and society, and exacerbated by
changes in the mass media. The idea of dilution was always "bewil-
deringly intangible," lacking even the anchor of a public interest in pre-
venting confusion.79 It is exceedingly difficult to draw " 'logical
boundaries'" around such a concept.80 A mass media, consumer-driven
society increases the level of abstraction. An explosion in entertainment
means an increase in advertisements. A decrease in attention span and
the "zapper" channel-changing phenomenon produced by readily avail-
74. Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles® cereal is made by Ralston Purina Co., St. Louis, Mo.





79. Note, supra note 63, at 528-29.
80. Id. at 529 (quoting Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg., 139 F. Supp. 228, 232 n. 1
(D. Mass. 1956), modified, 243 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1957)).
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able remote control devices logically leads to repetitive three or five-sec-
ond commercials. The result is that trademarks become part of the
language at a rapid rate. Acetyl salicylic acid becomes "aspirin" to eve-
ryone in just six months. Polite letters to on-line computerized diction-
ary updaters will not effectively defend against this phenomenon.
Yet the law will attempt to respond because valid interests are at
stake. It is unfair for a creator to lose his trademark as an ironic result of
the mark's success. Alternatively, perhaps the court does not like the
deceitful practices involved in certain cases. Where appropriate, the
court can stretch the antidilution statute to stem the tide of brand names
and characters that float into the public domain at an alarming rate. The
problem is that as the acceleration process continues, there is a concomi-
tant reduction in the pool of marks available in the public domain. A
tension is created which will have to be resolved.
IV
Conclusion
Since plaintiffs' attorneys will naturally attempt to protect their cli-
ents' interests, it falls to the courts to protect the urge to extend protec-
tion to every claim. At least one commentator has suggested that a court
should analogize to the formal environmental impact statements made by
claimants when the court considers the impact of a decision regarding
public lands."1
Even if this is not practically possible, it seems clear that courts need
to consider the shrinking public domain when handling a tenuous claim.
The goal is to recognize that public interest does exist in the preservation
of a public domain. In some cases, a plaintiff's claim will be strong and
outweigh this interest, but when the claim is weak and the statute amor-
phous, the court should exercise restraint.
Due to the tensions created by modern society, the law of unfair
competition will continue to stretch. Justice Learned Hand once wrote,
"There is no part of the law which is more plastic than unfair competi-
tion."82 But one should note that certain types of plastic, if poorly
designed, snap under pressure.
81. Lange, supra note 68, at 175.
82. Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925).
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